Introduction
Evolutionary game theory is the study of strategic interactions in large populations whose members base decisions on simple myopic rules. This approach to game theory stands in contrast to traditional approaches based on the assumption of equilibrium play. Of fundamental interest is the connection between the two approaches: To what extent do evolutionary models support traditional predictions of play? What sorts of myopic decision rules sustain this link?
In this paper, we seek evolutionary dynamics that exhibit three attractive properties regardless of the strategic environment at hand. Existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solutions (EUC) requires a dynamic to admit exactly one solution from each initial state, and requires solutions to change continuously as one varies the initial state. Failures of (EUC) mean that slightly inaccurate information about initial behavior can spawn large errors in predictions of future behavior, even over short spans of time. Nash stationarity (NS) requires a one-to-one link between the stationary states of an evolutionary dynamic and the Nash equilibria of the underlying game. This condition provides the basic link between the evolutionary dynamic and the predictions of the standard theory. Finally, positive correlation (PC) requires that strategies' growth rates and payoffs be positively correlated. In so doing, the condition ensures that out-ofequilibrium dynamics reflect strategic incentives in a reasonable way. 1 We call any dynamic that respects properties (EUC), (NS), and (PC) well-behaved.
Interestingly, neither of the two best known evolutionary dynamics are wellbehaved in the sense defined above. The replicator dynamic satisfies (EUC) and (PC), but fails (NS): while all Nash equilibria are rest points of this dynamic, the dynamic also admits boundary rest points that are not Nash equilibria. 2 The best response dynamic satisfies modified versions of (PC) and (NS), but fails (EUC). Since this dynamic's law of motion is discontinuous, even its behavior over short time spans is quite sensitive to its initial state. Thus, while solutions to the best response dynamic exist and are upper hemicontinuous in their initial conditions, multiple solution trajectories can emanate from a single initial condition. To understand what is at issue here, compare the replicator dynamic to the dynamic defined by its negation. The solution trajectories of this new dynamic are identical to those of the replicator dynamic after a reversal of time. Both of these dynamics satisfy property (EUC), and both generate identical rest points. But the dynamics have very different out-of-equilibrium properties. For instance, while strict Nash equilibria are asymptotically stable under the replicator dynamic, they are unstable under the timereversed version. 2 See, for example, Section 3.3 of Weibull (1995) . 3 Upper hemicontinuity follows from standard results on differential inclusions-see, for example, Theorem 4.11 of Smirnov (2002) . For examples of nonuniqueness of solutions, see Gilboa and Matsui Both the replicator dynamic and the best response dynamic can be derived from models of individual choice. The former dynamic describes aggregate behavior in certain models of imitation of successful agents, 4 while the latter dynamic is derived from a model of optimal choice.
In this paper, we introduce a new paradigm for individual choice in evolutionary models: in place of imitation or optimization, we consider moderation. Under this paradigm, agents exert moderate levels of effort to find strategies that perform well.
The measures taken to select good strategies are sufficiently modest that suboptimal and even subaverage choices are made with nonnegligible probability. Moderation obviously differs from optimization, and it is distinct from imitation in that it is based on direct rather than indirect evaluation of strategies' payoffs. Still, we believe that moderation aptly describes choice behavior in many situations naturally modeled using an evolutionary approach.
Our formal analysis starts with a simple model of individual choice. Agents receive opportunities to choose new strategies according to independent Poisson processes, choosing stochastically from the available strategies when such opportunities arise.
Both revision rates and choice probabilities are functions of the strategies' excess payoffs-that is, on the differences between the strategies' payoffs and the population's average payoff. More precisely, the agents' revision protocols are defined in terms of objects called raw choice functions , which map each excess payoff vector to a nonnegative vector ( ) called a raw choice vector. Revision rates are determined by the sum of the components of the raw choice vector, while choice probabilities are proportional to the components of this vector.
Rather than make specific assumptions about functional forms, we only require that raw choice functions satisfy two mild conditions that embody the notion of moderation described above. To rule out extreme sensitivity of decisions to the exact values of payoffs, we require raw choice functions to be Lipschitz continuous. In most contexts where evolutionary models are appropriate, excessive sensitivity of choice rules to payoffs seems unrealistic, making it natural to consider models that do not demand it.
To link choices to payoffs, we impose a condition called acuteness: each excess payoff vector and corresponding raw choice vector ( ) have a positive inner product. This condition ensures that whenever payoff improvement opportunities exist, revision (1991) , Matsui (1992), and Hofbauer (1995) . Perturbed versions of the best response dynamic are discussed below.
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See Björnerstedt and Weibull (1996) and Schlag (1998) . opportunities continue to arrive, and that revising agents show some tendency to select strategies with above average payoffs.
A game, a revision protocol, and an initial state define a Markov process through the space of strategy distributions. If the population size is large, this process is wellapproximated by the solutions to a certain differential equation. This equation, called the mean dynamic, is defined in terms of the expected change in the population's behavior at the current population state. 5 We call the class of mean dynamics derived from our model excess payoff dynamics.
The main result of this paper shows that every excess payoff dynamic is wellbehaved, in the sense of satisfying properties (EUC), (NS), and (PC). Therefore, unlike dynamics based on imitation and optimization, dynamics based on moderation satisfy all three of our evolutionary desiderata.
There is one canonical dynamic that satisfies all three of our desiderata: namely, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic. 6 Interestingly, the BNN dynamic is the simplest example of an excess payoff dynamic: it is generated when the raw choice function takes a separable semilinear form. Our analysis thus provides a microfoundation for the BNN dynamic, and it also shows that very little of the structure of this dynamic is needed to support the properties we seek.
One way to contend with the discontinuities inherent in the best response dynamic is to introduce perturbations of payoffs. The resulting smooth dynamics are known as perturbed best response dynamics; within this class, the logit dynamic is the best known special case.
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Unlike the original best response dynamic, perturbed best response dynamics satisfy condition (EUC). However, they fail conditions (NS) and (PC): because of the payoff disturbances, the rest points of perturbed best response dynamics differ from the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and the growth rates of these dynamics fail to be positively correlated with payoffs in a variety of regions of the state space.
In very rough terms, these violations of properties (NS) and (PC) are "small" when the payoff perturbations are "small", so that the perturbed best response dynamic is "close" to the exact best response dynamic. This observation may seem to suggest that how near a dynamic comes to satisfying these two desiderata depends on how close choices are to being optimal, or, alternatively, on how sensitive choices are to the exact 5 See Binmore and Samuelson (1999) , Sandholm (2003) , Benaïm and Weibull (2003) , and Section 2.2 below.
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value of the state. 8 The results in this paper show that these conclusions are false. The choice rules that underlie excess payoff dynamics can be quite remote from exact optimization, yet these dynamics always satisfy all three of our desiderata exactly.
The replicator dynamic and other imitative dynamics fail to be well-behaved because they violate Nash stationarity. Happily, we can use excess payoff dynamics to remedy this difficulty in a minimally intrusive fashion. In Section 4, we show that by modifying any imitative dynamic to an arbitrarily small extent, we can create new dynamics that satisfy all three of our desiderata. These new dynamics are convex combinations of the imitative dynamic and an arbitrary excess payoff dynamic; they can be derived from choice protocols that usually are based on imitation, but that occasionally rely on moderation.
Section 5 concludes the paper by describing two additional well-behaved dynamics, which we call the target projection dynamic and the projection dynamic. 9 We argue that both these two dynamics and all excess payoff dynamics can be derived from a common ancestor. We hope that this pedigree provides some preliminary steps toward a full characterization of well-behaved dynamics.
The Model

A Random Matching Model
To introduce our evolutionary dynamics in the simplest possible setting, we describe a model in which a single population of agents is recurrently randomly matched to play a symmetric normal form game. We present a more general model of evolution in Section 2.4.
Let S = {1, … , n} be a set of strategies from which individual agents choose, and let A R n n be a payoff matrix. Component A ij represents the payoff obtained by an agent who chooses action i when his opponent chooses action j.
A large, finite population of agents is recurrently randomly matched to play the game with payoff matrix A. A population state is a vector x in the simplex = {x R + n :
; component x i represents the current proportion of agents choosing strategy i. More precisely, when the population size is N, the state is a point in the discrete grid {x : Nx Z n }.
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The latter sort of sensitivity might be measured, for example, by the dynamic's Lipschitz constant.
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For the former dynamic, see Friesz et. al. (1994) ; for the latter, see Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) , Nagurney and Zhang (1996) , and Lahkar and Sandholm (2004) .
If an agent chooses action i when the population state is x, his (expected) payoff is F i (x) = (Ax) i = e i ·Ax; the average realized payoff at this population state is F(x) = x·Ax.
We define the excess payoff of strategy i as the difference between the two:
The excess payoff vector F (x) R n is given by
where 1 R n is a vector of ones.
Choice Rules and Revision Rates
We now describe our revision protocol. Agents receive revision opportunities via independent, variable rate Poisson processes. When an agent receives such an opportunity, he considers switching strategies. Both the rate at which agents receive revision opportunities and the probabilities with which they choose each strategy are functions of current excess payoffs.
Payoffs influence strategy choices in all evolutionary models. Allowing payoffs to influence revision rates is less common, but seems reasonable in many contexts. 10 For instance, the model below can be used in settings in which agents revise more frequently when the differences in strategies' payoffs are large than when these differences are small.
This revision process is defined in terms of a raw choice function , which is a map from excess payoff vectors
We can leave undefined on int( R n ) because an excess payoff vector cannot lie in this set: for this to occur, every strategy would need to earn a strictly below average payoff, which is clearly impossible. Note that int( R n * ) = R n -R n is the set of excess payoff vectors under which at least one strategy has an above average payoff, while bd(
is the set of excess payoff vectors under which no strategy earns an above average payoff.
Given the raw choice function , revision rates and choice probabilities are determined as follows. When the excess payoff vector is , each agent's revision opportunities arrive at a rate given by the sum of the components of ( ) : that is, ( )
. After an agent receives a revision opportunity, he selects a strategy according to the choice rule : R n * , the outputs of which are proportional to the raw choice vector:
Choice probabilities can be arbitrary when T ( ) = 0 since in this situation no revision opportunities arise.
To interpret the raw choice function directly, consider the rate at which agents currently playing strategies other than i switch to strategy i. Under the (implicit)
assumption that the arrivals of revision opportunities and the choices made thereafter are independent, this rate is given by ( ) i ( ) = i ( ) . Describing the model in this manner highlights a form of inertia built into our revision process: if for each j i the scalar j ( ) is small, then agents playing strategy i rarely switch to other strategies.
To connect the agents' revision procedure with the underlying game, we impose two conditions on the raw choice function .
The first condition, Lipschhitz continuity, asks that raw choice weights be Lipschitz continuous functions of excess payoffs. Discontinuous raw choice functions exhibit an extreme sensitivity to the exact value of excess payoffs. In most applications, this level of sensitivity seems unrealistic, and so condition (LC) precludes it. The second condition, acuteness, requires that the excess payoff vector and the raw choice vector ( ) have a positive inner product whenever lies in the interior of R n * .
This condition has distinct implications for revision rates and choice probabilities. For the former, condition (A) requires that whenever some strategy's excess payoff is strictly positive, the revision rate is strictly positive as well. In other words, acuteness implies a sort of persistence: as long as some agents would benefit from switching strategies, revision opportunities continue to arrive. Concerning choice probabilities, condition (A) requires that whenever some strategy achieves a strictly positive excess payoff, the expected value of a component of chosen at random according to the probability distribution ( ) is strictly positive. Thus, on average, agents choose strategies with above average payoffs.
The simplest raw choice function satisfying conditions (LC) and (A) takes a separable semilinear form:
Two increasingly general specifications are the truncated monomial forms
and the separable forms
Separable raw choice functions only assign positive weights to strategies with positive excess payoffs. We now show that neither separability nor sign-preservation is implied by conditions (LC) and (A). Consider the raw choice function Proof: In the Appendix.
The lower bound on the exponent k is quite weak: for example, we can let k = 1 as long as the number of pure strategies n does not exceed 41.
Evolutionary Dynamics
The evolutionary process defined above generates a Markov process on the simplex, with the realized sample path of this process depending on the realizations of each agent's revision opportunities and randomized choices. Using methods from the theory of convergence of Markov processes, Binmore and Samuelson (1999) , Sandholm (2003) , and Benaïm and Weibull (2003) show that when the population size is large, the behavior of such processes is closely approximated by the solutions of a differential equation. This equation, the mean dynamic of the Markov process, is defined in terms of the expected changes in the population's behavior given the current population state.
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To derive the mean dynamic for the present model, suppose that the current population state is x. Since there are N agents in the population, the expected number of agents receiving revision opportunities during the next dt time units is N (F(x)) dt.
Since all agents are equally likely to receive revision opportunities, the expected number of opportunities received by agents currently choosing strategy i is N (F(x)) x i dt. Finally, since choice probabilities are determined using the choice rule , the expected number of agents who receive opportunities and select strategy i is N (F(x)) i (F(x)) dt. Therefore, the expected change in the number of agents choosing strategy i during the next dt time units is given by
The expected change in the proportion of agents choosing strategy i during the next dt time units is
We therefore conclude that the mean dynamic for our Markov process is
This dynamic has a simple interpretation: the population state always moves directly toward the "target state" defined by the current choice probability vector (F(x)) , at a speed determined by the revision rate (F(x)) R + .
By substituting in the definitions of and , we can write this expression directly in terms of the raw choice function :
When satisfies conditions (LC) and (A), we call this differential equation an excess payoff dynamic.
More specifically, these papers show that during any finite time span, the actual behavior of the population stays within a narrow band surrounding the solution to the mean dynamic with high probability if the population size is sufficiently large. (1), we obtain the excess payoff dynamic
This equation is known as the Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamic. This dynamic was introduced in the context of symmetric zero-sum games by Brown and von Neumann (1950) , more recently reintroduced by Skyrms (1990) , Swinkels (1992) , and Weibull (1996) , and further investigated by Hofbauer (2000) , Berger and Hofbauer (2001), and Sandholm (2001) . 12 We can use this dynamic to demonstrate the importance of allowing revision rates to vary. Had we fixed the revision rate fixed at one, we would have obtained the mean dynamic
The initial term in this equation, representing current choice probabilities, is discontinuous: a small change in the state that causes a strategy's payoff to drop below average can force the probability with which the strategy is chosen to jump from 1 to 0. 13 It follows that the fixed rate dynamic is discontinuous as well. By allowing revision opportunities to arrive slowly when the benefits of switching strategies become small, we are able to ensure that our law of motion is Lipschitz continuous in the population state, thus ensuring the existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solution trajectories.
Connections with the Best Response Dynamic
The truncated monomial raw choice function (2) yields the choice rule
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For the connection with Nash (1951) , see Section 5.
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For example, in a two strategy game, the choice probability for strategy 1 equals 1 if F 1 (x) > F 2 (x), equals 0 if F 1 (x) < F 2 (x), and is undefined otherwise. As long as neither strategy is dominant, a jump of the sort noted above must occur.
If we let k approach infinity, then whenever the resulting limit exists it is described by the discontinuous choice rule (7) ( ) = arg max y y .
If we view equation (7) the resulting the mean dynamic is given by
This is the best response dynamic of Gilboa and Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992) .
Since the best response correspondence B is discontinuous, the best response dynamic possesses certain nonstandard properties. In particular, while solutions to this dynamic are certain to exist, they need not be unique; in certain cases, this multiplicity can be the source of quite complicated solution trajectories (Hofbauer (1995) ). The discontinuities that spawn these difficulties are consequences of exact optimization.
Under moderation, raw choice weights cannot depend too finely on payoff opportunities; this coarseness ensures that solution trajectories are not only unique, but also continuous in the initial state.
Population Games
We conclude this section by introducing a more general class of strategic environments to which our analysis will apply. This new framework generalizes the symmetric random matching framework from Section 2.1 by allowing for multiple populations of agents (i.e., player roles) and by permitting payoffs to depend nonlinearly on the population state. While the games we define here are formally specified using continuous sets of players, one can interpret our results as providing approximate descriptions of the evolution of play in populations that are large but finite. Let P = {1, ... , p} denote the set of populations, where p 1. Population masses are described by the vector m = ( m 1 , … , m p ). The set of strategies for population p is denoted S p = {1, ... , n p }, and n = n p p P equals the total number of pure strategies.
The set of strategy distributions within population p P is denoted assume that the population mass is one and omit the redundant superscript p.
. Hence, the excess payoff to
is the excess payoff vector for population p. State x X is a Nash equilibrium of F if each strategy used at x is a best response to x.
Formally, x is a Nash equilibrium if For all p P and i S p , x i p > 0 implies that i arg max
An evolutionary dynamic for a game F is a differential equation x = V(x) that describes the motion of the population through the set of population states X. The vector field V is a map from X to TX = {z R n : z i p i S p = 0 for all p P}, the tangent space for the set X.
Suppose that agents in population p use a revision rate function p and a choice rule p derived from some raw choice function p . The resulting mean dynamic is We can once again rewrite our dynamic in terms of the raw choice functions p :
Definition: If the raw choice functions p satisfy conditions (LC) and (A), we call equation
(E) an excess payoff dynamic.
Properties of Excess Payoff Dynamics
We now define the three desiderata described informally in the introduction.
(EUC) x = V(x) admits a unique solution trajectory {x t } t 0 = { t (x)} t 0 from every initial condition x X, a trajectory that remains in X for all time.
Moreover, for each t 0, t (x) is Lipschitz continuous in x.
(NS) x X is a rest point of V if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium of F.
Condition (EUC) requires the existence, uniqueness, and continuity of solution trajectories. As we argued earlier, this condition ensures that predictions of behavior are not overly sensitive to the exact value of the initial state, and it abrogates the analytical difficulties that discontinuous dynamics present.
Condition (NS), Nash stationarity, requires that the rest points of the dynamics and the Nash equilibria of the underlying game coincide. The condition captures the idea that there should be no impetus leading the population state to change if and only if no agent can unilaterally improve his payoffs.
Condition (PC), positive correlation, requires that the growth rates and payoffs of strategies within each population be positively correlated, strictly so whenever the some growth rate is nonzero. To see that the equality stated in the condition is true, notice that
where the second and fourth equalities follow from the fact that V(x) TX. Conditions closely related to positive correlation have been proposed by Friedman (1991 ), Swinkels (1993 ), and Sandholm (2001 . Requirements of this sort are the weakest used in the evolutionary literature, as they restrict each population's behavior using only a single scalar inequality.
14 We call a dynamic well-behaved if it satisfies properties (EUC), (NS), and (PC)
regardless of the population game F being played. With this definition in hand, we can state our main result.
Theorem 3.1: Every excess payoff dynamic is well-behaved.
Property (EUC) is a direct consequence of the facts that excess payoff dynamics are
Lipschitz continuous and that they are inward pointing on the boundary of X. 15 To establish the other two properties, we prove three preliminary results.
Lemma 3.2: Let x = V(x) be an excess payoff dynamic. Then for all p P and x X,
Part (i) of Lemma 3.2 observes that each population's state is always orthogonal to its excess payoff vector. Part (ii) shows that condition (PC) holds whenever some strategy earns an above average payoff.
Proof:
Then the fact that V(x) TX, part (i) of the lemma, and acuteness imply that
For stronger monotonicity conditions, see Nachbar (1990) , Samuelson and Zhang (1992) , Ritzberger and Weibull (1995) , and Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) . 
Proof: For notational convenience, we only consider the case in which p = 1; the proof of the general case is an easy extension.
Now were i ( ) strictly greater than zero, it would follow from continuity that
The last three expressions would then imply that ( ( )) ( ) < 0 for all sufficiently small , contradicting acuteness. Therefore, i ( ) = 0.
(ii) Follows immediately from part (i).
and suppose that i ( ) > 0.
Define ( ) = -e j + 2 e j int( R n * ) (see Figure 2) . If k {i, j}, then
Thus,
which by continuity must be strictly negative once small. This contradicts acuteness. We therefore conclude that i ( ) = 0.
[ 
Proof: We first prove that (i) implies (ii). If condition (i) holds, then all strategies in the support of x p yield the maximal payoff, which is therefore the population's average
Second, we show that (ii) implies (i). Suppose that
, and let i be a strategy in the support of
. Since a strategy maximizes excess payoffs if and only if it also maximizes actual payoffs, we conclude that i arg max
second clock, which arrive at a much slower rate, lead to a randomized choice according to mixed strategy p . This perturbation of the dynamic eliminates all rest points that are not Nash equilibria. Still, the assumption about behavior on which it is based seems rather ad hoc. It also has some negative consequences: under the perturbed dynamic, growth rates and payoffs are negatively correlated near the boundary of X and near the rest points that survive the perturbation; moreover, these surviving rest points need only approximate Nash equilibria.
The analysis in Section 3 leads us to consider a different modification of I. Let V be an excess payoff dynamic, and define a new dynamic C by
As before, one can interpret this dynamic in terms of pairs of Poisson alarm clocks; this time, the second alarm clock rings at a variable rate (·), and leads to the use of a choice rule (·) as defined above. Put differently, the dynamic C captures the behavior of agents whose decisions are usually based on imitation, but are occasionally based on moderate efforts to choose a strategy that performs well, whether or not it is currently in use. As Theorem 4.1 shows, this modification eliminates non-Nash rest points of the imitative dynamic, and does so without disturbing the dynamic's other desirable properties. Proof: In the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Out of our three desiderata for evolutionary dynamics, imitative dynamics only fail condition (NS), and then only on the boundary of the state space. It is therefore quite easy to introduce modifications of these dynamics that eliminate this failure, but typically at the cost of introducing other failures. Excess payoff dynamics are desirable modifications because they themselves satisfy (EUC), (PC) and (NS). This fact allows us to recover condition (NS) while preserving our other desiderata.
In addition to being well-behaved, many combined dynamics C have another appealing property: the local stability of their rest points only depends on the rest points' stability under the imitative dynamic I. As an example, consider a single population game F, and the excess payoff dynamic
k , where the exponent k is strictly greater than one. Then is well defined on all of R n , and one can check that its derivative matrix D ( ) is the zero matrix whenever the excess payoff vector lies on the boundary of R n * . Proposition 3.4 shows that the excess payoff vector F (x) lies on this boundary whenever x is a Nash equilibrium. It follows that the derivative matrix DV(x) of the dynamic V is the zero matrix at any equilibrium, and consequently that
Therefore, if the Nash equilibrium x is a hyperbolic rest point of the imitative dynamic I, 19 then the eigenvalues of DI(x) determine the stability of x not only under I, but also under the combined dynamic C .
We express this idea in somewhat greater generality in the following proposition. 
Additional Well-Behaved Dynamics
The properties that define excess payoff dynamics are sufficient conditions for an evolutionary dynamic to be well-behaved. Are there simple necessary conditions for a dynamic to be well-behaved? How close are these necessary conditions to the sufficient conditions studied here?
To conclude this paper, we present two additional well-behaved dynamics, neither of which are excess payoff dynamics. While doing so, we argue that excess payoff dynamics and these two new dynamics can all be viewed as descendents of a common
ancestor. This genealogy may provide a first step toward answering the questions raised above.
For convenience, we consider games played by a single population, so that population states are elements of the simplex X. The common ancestor of all the dynamics we consider is the discrete-time "ur-dynamic"
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The rest point x is hyperbolic if the eigenvalues of the derivative matrix DI(x) corresponding to eigenvectors in the tangent space TX have nonzero real parts.
In this expression, 1 is the vector of ones, and t represents a reference payoff at time t.
The right hand side of (U) need not define an element of the simplex, and we use the symbol " " to emphasize that (U) does not specify a well-defined dynamic. Yet there is a sense in which this expression captures a property intimately connected with wellbehavedness: strategies whose payoffs are high should tend to be come more common, while strategies whose payoffs are low should tend to become less so.
If t = F(x t ) = x t · F(x t ) equals the average payoff in the population at time t, then (U) becomes
To turn this expression into a legitimate dynamic, we replace the excess payoff vector F (x t ) with a nonnegative proxy: the raw choice vector (F(x t )) .
(8)
The right hand side of expression (8) is a positive vector, so normalizing its components to sum to one yields a legitimate discrete-time dynamic:
It is not difficult to show that if is continuous and acute, then the rest points of (9) are the Nash equilibria of F. In fact, if returns the positive parts of excess payoffs (i.e., if i ( ) = [ i ] + ), then equation (9) is the mapping used in Nash's (1951) proof of existence of equilibrium.
To obtain a continuous-time dynamic, we shorten the time increment and the state increment in expression (8) in this natural way:
Normalizing again yields a well-defined discrete-time dynamic:
) .
-21-To obtain a continuous-time dynamic, we rearrange this expression to obtain
.
Then taking limits of both sides of this equation as goes to zero yields
the excess payoff dynamic derived from excess payoff function .
We obtain our two new well-behaved dynamics through a different method of salvaging the ur-dynamic (U). This time, we replace the vector
with the closest point to this vector in the simplex X. That is,
where X denotes the closest-point projection onto the closed convex set X. Actually, since the vector 1 is orthogonal to the simplex, the previous equation can be rewritten as
regardless of the specification of the reference payoff t .
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One way to derive a continuous-time dynamic from equation (10) is to consider stepping only of the way from x t to X (x t + F(x t )) during the first time interval of length :
Rearranging this equation yields
and so taking to zero yields
Equation (10) is not new to game theory. Gul, Pearce, Stacchetti (1993) observe that the fixed points of this equation are the Nash equilibria of F. These authors credit Hartman and Stampacchia (1966) for introducing this map in a more general mathematical context.
We call the dynamic (TP) the target projection dynamic. To the best of our knowledge, this dynamic first appeared in the transportation science literature in the work of Friesz et. al. (1994) . It is not difficult to verify that the target projection dynamic is wellbehaved. Unfortunately, we do not know of an appealing way of deriving this dynamic from a model of individual choice.
Alternatively, we can derive a continuous time dynamic from equation (10) by reducing the size of the increment in the state before employing the projection X : 21 x t+ = X (x t + F(x t )).
Subtracting x t and dividing by on each side of this equation yields
By taking the limit as approaches zero and appealing to a geometrically obvious fact from convex analysis, 22 we obtain the following differential equation:
(P) x t = TX( x t ) (F(x t )) .
The right hand side of equation (P) is the projection of the payoff vector F(x t ) onto TX(x t ), the cone of feasible directions of motion from state x t . On the interior of the simplex, equation (P) immediately reduces to
where
is the excess payoff to strategy i over the unweighted average payoff. On the boundary of the simplex, describing the dynamic without using projections requires some 21 This order of operations is analogous to the one we used when deriving the excess payoff dynamic earlier in this section. In that case, reversing the order of the two initial operations (i.e., normalizing before reducing the step size) results in a dynamic that is equivalent to the excess payoff dynamic up to a reparameterization of time. 22 See, e.g., Proposition 3.5.3.5 of Hiriart-Urruty and Lemaréchal (1993) . additional effort. Lahkar and Sandholm (2004) call the dynamic (P) the projection dynamic.
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Since the set of feasible directions TX(x t ) changes discontinuously as the boundary of the simplex is reached, the dynamic (P) is discontinuous. Nevertheless, results of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) , who study projection dynamics in a broader mathematical context, imply that the dynamic (P) nevertheless satisfies our existence, uniqueness, and continuity property (EUC). With this property in hand, it is not difficult to show that the projection dynamic respects properties (NS) and (PC), and so that it is well-behaved.
Unlike the target projection dynamic (TP), the projection dynamic (P) can be derived from a natural model of individual choice. It also has the attractive property of eliminating all iteratively strictly dominated strategies of the underlying game. For detailed analyses of the payoff projection dynamic, we refer the reader to Nagurney and Zhang (1996) and Lahkar and Sandholm (2004) .
We have now described two well-behaved dynamics that are not excess payoff dynamics, but that like excess payoff dynamics are descended from the ur-dynamic (U).
Necessary and sufficient conditions for dynamics to be well-behaved, as well as the relationship between these conditions and equation (U), are important topics for future research.
Appendix: Additional Proofs
The Proof of Proposition 2.1 Lipschitz continuity, nonseparability, and strict positivity clearly hold. To check acuteness, we compute that
The second summation is strictly positive on int( R n * ). To sign the first summation, note that the derivative of its ith term, c exp(c i )(c i + k + 2), has the same sign as i + k + 2 c .
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On the interior of the simplex, the dynamic (P) is equivalent to Friedman's (1991) linear dynamic (see his Appendix A.1). However, there are important differences between the definitions of the two dynamics on the boundary of the simplex. For example, while Friedman's linear dynamic admits nonNash rest points on bd(X), the projection dynamic satisfies Nash stationarity, and is even well-behaved. See Lahkar and Sandholm (2004) for further discussion.
